Vending Rights and Public Safety: Delhi High Court Reaffirms Nehru Place as a No-Vending Zone
The competing claims of livelihood, regulation of public spaces and public safety frequently intersect in disputes concerning street vending. The Delhi High Court recently considered this balance in relation to the Nehru Place District Centre, reaffirming its status as a “No-Hawking Zone” and “No-Vending Zone” while providing interim protection to a limited category of recognised vendors pending consideration of their claims by the competent Town Vending Committee.
In CONT.CAS(C) 703/2021 and connected matters, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, comprising of Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Dinesh Bhatt considered the continuing presence of vendors in Nehru Place against the backdrop of previous judicial orders declaring the area a no-hawking/no-vending zone.
A Status Settled by Earlier Proceedings
The litigation concerning vending in Nehru Place has a long history.
The no-hawking/no-vending status of the District Centre had previously been affirmed in Bachchu Singh (2017) and Federation of Nehru Place Association (Regd.) v. SDMC (2018). The position was subsequently left undisturbed when the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition on 6 January 2022.
The Division Bench therefore proceeded on the basis that the status of Nehru Place as a no-hawking/no-vending zone was settled and could not simply be reopened in subsequent proceedings.
This aspect of the decision assumes significance beyond the immediate dispute. Where the legal status of an area has already been conclusively determined through earlier proceedings and has survived scrutiny before the Supreme Court, subsequent attempts to relitigate the same issue are likely to face a substantial hurdle.
Public Safety as a Central Consideration
The Court's consideration was not confined to the earlier judicial history.
A significant factor was the material concerning emergency access and public safety within the District Centre.
A mock fire drill conducted in the area revealed serious difficulties in accessing the lower plaza. Fire engines and ambulances were unable to reach portions of the area easily, with the first fire unit taking approximately 11 minutes to reach the relevant location.
The Delhi Fire Services recommended that the area remain hawker-free. Photographs placed before the Court also demonstrated the extent to which access and movement within the area had been obstructed.
The case therefore raised a broader question: how should livelihood rights be balanced where the use of public space begins to interfere with emergency access and the safety of those using that space?
The judgment demonstrates the importance of objective evidence in such disputes. Fire Services findings, mock drills, site inspections and contemporaneous photographs may carry considerably greater weight than assertions founded merely upon the duration of occupation.
Recognised Vendors and Site X
The Court was also required to address the position of vendors claiming protection under the statutory framework governing street vending.
Of more than 400 vendors stated to be operating in the District Centre, only approximately 90 vendors had a recognised claim.
The Court considered their position in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Malkit Singh v. State of U.T. Chandigarh (2026), which recognises the obligation of the State to deal appropriately with vendors affected by enforcement and relocation.
The recognised vendors were accordingly directed to shift to the designated Site X by 12 October 2026, where they could temporarily operate pending consideration of their claims by TVC-II.
Once constituted, TVC-II is required to determine whether such vendors are entitled to Certificates of Vending and, where appropriate, identify the locations at which they may lawfully vend.
The arrangement thus preserves the statutory process for determining individual vending rights without disturbing the judicially settled status of Nehru Place as a no-vending zone.
Section 3(3) of the Street Vendors Act
An important question raised before the Court concerned Section 3(3) of the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014.
The Court recorded the contention that Section 3(3) does not confer protection upon a person seeking to vend within an area already declared to be a no-vending zone.
The Court did not, however, substitute itself for the statutory authority responsible for determining individual claims. While reaffirming the no-vending declaration, it left questions concerning Certificates of Vending and the entitlement of recognised vendors to the competent Town Vending Committee.
The distinction is important.
The existence of a statutory mechanism protecting street vendors does not necessarily translate into an unrestricted right to vend at a location of the vendor's choice. The statutory entitlement of an individual vendor and the regulatory classification of a particular public space remain distinct questions.
Enforcement and Relocation
The judgment also reflects a developing theme in street-vending jurisprudence following Malkit Singh: enforcement and relocation cannot always be considered in isolation.
Where authorities seek removal of vendors who possess a recognised or potentially valid statutory claim, the availability of an appropriate mechanism for determining that claim — and, where necessary, identifying an alternative vending location — becomes relevant.
At the same time, persons seeking judicial protection against removal must demonstrate more than long-standing physical occupation. A legally recognised claim under the statutory framework assumes considerable importance.
The approach seeks to accommodate both sides of the regulatory equation: the protection of legitimate livelihood interests and the ability of civic authorities to preserve public spaces, accessibility and safety.
Key Takeaways
The judgment offers several broader lessons for disputes concerning street vending and regulation of public spaces.
First, where the legal status of an area has already been conclusively determined by earlier judicial decisions, particularly decisions that have survived proceedings before the Supreme Court, subsequent attempts to reopen that status face a significant obstacle.
Second, statutory protection available to street vendors does not necessarily amount to a right to vend in every location. The entitlement of an individual vendor must be distinguished from the regulatory status of the area in which vending is sought.
Third, objective evidence relating to public safety can be decisive. Fire safety assessments, emergency response drills, photographs and other contemporaneous material can substantially influence the Court's assessment of competing claims.
Finally, the emerging approach requires enforcement and legitimate vendor claims to be addressed together. Authorities must follow the statutory framework when dealing with recognised vendors, while vendors seeking protection must establish an entitlement recognised by law rather than relying solely upon long occupation.
Conclusion
The Nehru Place proceedings illustrate the complexity of regulating heavily used urban spaces.
The dispute was not simply one between vendors and property owners, nor merely a question of livelihood versus regulation. It required the Court to consider the effect of earlier binding decisions, the statutory framework governing street vending, the rights of recognised vendors and, importantly, evidence demonstrating the impact of unrestricted vending upon emergency access and public safety.
The judgment ultimately preserves the settled no-vending status of Nehru Place while ensuring that recognised vendor claims are considered through the mechanism contemplated by law.
It is therefore an important illustration of how courts may balance livelihood rights, statutory protections, urban regulation and public safety within a single regulatory framework.
*Utkarsh Associates appeared for the Federation of Nehru Place Association
